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COMMENT:
THE AMERICAN AIRLINES INDUSTRY AND
THE NECESSITY OF DEREGULATION
SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY*
A S THE CHAIRMAN of the the United States' Senate Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice, I have had the opportunity in recent months to
observe and review in great detail the practices and procedures utilized
by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in its regulation and control of the
varied aspects of the American airlines industry. During the preceeding 18
months, the Subcommittee's oversight of the operations of the CAB has been
extremely comprehensive consisting of 10 days of public hearings in which
72 witnesses were called to testify before the Subcommittee. Extensive
questionnaires directed to each of the individual airlines and the CAB
itself were also included, as well as numerous economic studies which were
conducted and reviewed in many instances in order to provide sufficient
factual data and information to aid in the Subcommittee's investigation.
This rather exhaustive effort by the members of the Subcommittee and
their staff was finally condensed into a 255 page report. It would be ex-
tremely difficult, absent a detailed analysis, to summarize the findings of
the Subcommittee's exhaustive study. However, the final report clearly
reflects the fact that the domestic airline industry is naturally competitive
and further, that unwise, unnecessarily overextensive, and virtually un-
controlled federal regulation has served only to raise fares substantially,
promote inefficiency, and discourage new, innovative businessmen from
entering the industry. Based upon these determinations, the Subcommittee
quite simply recommends that such regulation as currently exists, be ended.
Over the long run, the most damaging authority exercised by the CAB
is clearly its power to prevent new entry, not only through the severe re-
strictions placed upon the rights of existing airlines to expand services by
entering new routes and thereby providing competition among those on
such routes, but also by the prevention of entry by new enterprises into the
airline industry market itself. Such an attitude seems to contradict the in-
tentions of the legislature in adopting the Civil Aviation Act of 1938.
Indeed, the chief sponsor in the Senate, Senator McCarren stated: "In the
proposed bill there is nothing to prevent a little fellow with a new idea [and]
with plenty of capital from establishing an airline."
Yet, the CAB has failed during its 38 years of existence to permit a
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new trunk airline to directly compete with the original domestic trunks.
This failure is not due to the lack of applications from various sources request-
ing such an opportunity as can be seen from the fact that 79 have been
submitted since 1950, with none having been accepted. In fact, the
CAB has granted a hearing to only four of the applications submitted
during that period of time. This control of competition has even been ex-
ercised extensively to provide restrictions among present carriers. Between
1969 and 1974 the CAB secretly instituted a route moratorium in which
virtually all major proposals for competitive route authority were denied
a hearing despite the fact that the statute clearly states that such applications
shall be decided as speedily as possible. Most insidiously, this policy was
instituted in such a way that the airlines could not even appeal for a judicial
review of the CAB's determinations.
This anti-competitive attitude regarding entry carries over into the
area of fares, where the CAB has always discouraged price competition.
On April 29, 1974, it took the extraordinary step of virtually outlawing
price competition and now sets all coach and first class fares within the
continental United States according to a formula which seems to be based
primarily on administrative convenience. The CAB itself has admitted that
it was not based on the costs of serving the individual routes.
The results of such regulation may be seen by comparing the service
provided by the CAB regulated carriers with the service provided by intra-
state carriers in those states large enough to have their own airlines -
California and Texas. These intrastate carriers fly the same routes and charge
20 to 50 percent less than the CAB regulated carriers. The low fares have
stimulated consumer traffic to such a degree that the intrastate carriers
have increased the number of flights on respective routes.
The misdirection of federal regulation is further evidenced by the
classic case of World Airways. In 1967, World offered to fly the coast
to coast route for $75 while the CAB carriers were charging $145. The
CAB never conducted a hearing, and finally dismissed the application in
1973 following a determination that it was "stale." In 1975, World again
proposed to furnish air transportation coast to coast for $89.00 while the
established CAB airlines were charging $179, the same being the rate
approved by the CAB. Once again, following what has been termed as a
strained interpretation of the law, the CAB denied this proposal by World
and eliminated at least for the time being all possibility of a reduction in
fares for this route.
The investigation conducted by the Subcommittee has led to the con-
clusion that strained interpretations are hardly exceptions to the general
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rule, but rather the general rule itself. Such an authoritarian and limiting
approach to regulation within the airlines' industry seems hardly conducive
to the public interest, at least as that term has been conceived by the mem-
bers of the Subcommittee. The recommendations unanimously presented
by the Subcommittee are defiinite, unwavering and capable of only one
interpretation: Federal regulation of the domestic airlines industry must
be drastically reduced if that industry is to serve the "public interest" to
the greatest possible degree.
More specifically, the Subcommittee proposed the following amend-
ments to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958:
1. Require that major shifts in CAB policy take place only after
adequate opportunity is given both to members of the industry and
the general public to submit views and arguments.
2. Provide strict time limits governing route cases.
3. Liberalize entry requirements gradually so that eventually any
firm wishing to supply air service on a route is allowed to do so
on a showing that it is "fit, willing and able."
4. Allow carriers flexibility to charge the prices they desire. The CAB
should retain a rate ceiling, but no floor, removing the ceiling only
when entry rules become sufficiently liberal for the threat of new
competition to hold prices down.
5. Liberalize restrictions on charter travel.
6. Adopt a standard that would prohibit any act that would violate
the antitrust laws, unless the anticompetitive effects are clearly
outweighed in the public interest by the need to secure a sig-
nificant transportation objective.
7. Increase substantially the protection of the consumer against, among
other things, the exigencies of lost baggage, overcharging, and fare
complexities.
I am convinced that we are today in the middle of what will prove
to be a fundamental and exciting change in federal aviation policy. When
the present debate in the Congress draws to a close, I am hopeful that
laws will have been enacted which will foster the growth of a more efficient,
more competitive, lower-fare airline system that will provide better service
for college students and working men and women, as well as business
executives and the wealthy.
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